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ON ABSOLUTENESS AND RELATIVITY:

Modern Philosophy in Ancient Times

Within this short paper¹ I do not intend to compare systems of philosophies; rather, I am trying here to compare kinds of philosophizing, hereby not all of its main aspects but its core, namely: whether or not some philosophizing is related to some *fix-point*, so to speak: to some *Archimedean point*, and thereby, whether or not such philosophizing is leading to a *closed system* of philosophy.

In order to get a clean understanding of the *cores* of the kinds of *modern* philosophizing, it is unavoidable to gain a suitable amount of *profound* knowledge of *Ancient Greek* philosophies and its kinds of philosophizing; and in order to get a clean understanding of the *cores* of the kinds of *Ancient Greek* philosophizing, it is unavoidable to gain a suitable amount of *profound* knowledge of *Ancient Indian* philosophies and its kinds of philosophizing. This presupposes that not only mathematical disciplines but also systems of philosophies and kinds of philosophizing were traded from East to West during the centuries; and, according to my historical knowledge as well as to my viewing a tremendous amount of similarities among the philosophies at consecutive times, this really happened.

With regard to *that* object, which nowadays at our universities is called „philosophy“, its *birth place* is – and surely will remain – *unknown* to us. And, most probably, there was *not* the *one* birth place of philosophizing at this earth; quite on the contrary, it is highly probable that a lot of alternative former traditions of philosophies *never* reached our eras. As far as we can see *nowadays*, the *earliest* sources of philosophizing are to be found in Ancient India, more exactly: at the area of its Ganges plain. Within about three centuries around 800 B.C., a remarkable large number of philosophical systems was born there, whose parents were – most probable – the views of the priests of the Arian immigrating conquerers in its coming-together with the views of the priests of the Dravidian original inhabitants. Unfortunately, in almost all cases the philosophical texts traded to our days are just extended summaries of those former philosophies, mostly without references to the authors of them and to the respective periods of their teachings.

During the centuries after this establishing of sophisticated philosophies in Ancient India, the *first series* of trading and transmitting philosophies from India to the West took place, namely to philosophers of Ancient Greece like Pythagoras, Parmenides, and Platon. The *second series* of that kind took place about two thousand years later, when sailors and businessmen of the *East Indian Company* started to bring *precious things* from India to England as well as later on from England to Germany and even to Russia; and among these *precious things* were, from the 18th century on, translations of Sanskrit-texts. But at that periods, businessmen were not so narrow-minded as they are presenting themselves nowadays; for their oral trading of cultural and religious backgrounds of Medieval Indian culture was by far not less important for curious listeners at home, be it London or be it Koenigsberg.² Therefore, it will be worthwhile to investigate the gross as well as the subtle relations esp. of Indian idealistic-phenomenalistic philosophies of India with those of Europe from the 18th century onward, starting with Berkeley and Kant, but not ending with Mach and Wittgenstein.

Among the remarkable Western philosophers of modern times, Schopenhauer was the *first one* – and, as far as I can see, the *only one* – who confessed to be influenced by Ancient Indian philosophy in general and by Buddhist philosophy in particular. And the influence of Ancient Indian philosophy to German philosophy increased during the second half of the 19th and the first third of the 20th century. For at that period, long before Neumann's translations, more and more Theravāda-Buddhist sūtras were translated from Pāli into German. At that time, Deussen started to translate the

¹ This paper was read at the *Interim world Philosophy Congress* at Delhi on 15th December 2006.

² See Kant: „... wie tüchtige englische Seeleute berichten ...“, in „Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht“.

Brāhmaṇa texts as well as large parts of the Upaniṣad texts from Sanskrit into German. And all these translations were known among the German philosophers of that period, however they judged the philosophical values of these translated texts. Nietzsche as well as Mach were by far not the only ones among them. Nietzsche's Zarathustra-figure is indeed nothing but an ancient Brāhmiṇ who from time to time is leaving his forest retreat in order to teach the worldly people of the near city. And Mach's epistemology was considered and is still considered to be mainly influenced by Buddhist Mādhyamika philosophy.

At a first glance, also Wittgenstein's „Tractatus logico-philosophicus“ seems to be influenced in its basis by Buddhist philosophy; and I too believed this until some years ago. Because his epistemology contains many similarities to that of the Northern Buddhist philosophies; and his ladder-simile is obviously purloined from the Southern Buddhist sūtras, esp. from Buddha Śākyamuni's raft-simile.³ But, as I am seeing it now, the core of Wittgenstein's philosophy contains a genuine non-Buddhist and even anti-Buddhist background. For his epistemology maintains the existence of an absolute *I*, whereby this final *I* of all observing and thinking is the creator and maintainer of his world, so to speak in short: „I and the world are the same, i.e. are not different things.“

For, according to Wittgenstein and very closely to Yājñavalkya, that part of the *I*, which is observing and thinking, is neither observable nor describable but nevertheless – in activating one's inner eye – somehow experienceable, namely noticeable within observing the observable things and within thinking the describable things, describable by outer or by inner speech. But reflecting on that uppermost *I* as well as on the world as a whole *will* lead and *is to* lead to a fundamental error; and here, Wittgenstein's arguments are related to suitable summaries of the argumentations of Nagārjuna, in spite of being otherwise in complete dissension with Nagārjuna but in consensus with Yājñavalkya. For the core of Yājñavalkya's philosophy is characterized by him several times in this way:⁴

„You cannot see the seeing one. You cannot hear the hearing one. You cannot understand the understanding one. You cannot recognize the recognizing one. But just that one is your ātman – i.e. your Self – which is within all (which is seen, heard, understood, recognized). And what is different from that one, that is suffering.“

Of course, Wittgenstein is thinking and saying „being subject to the laws of the world“ instead of „is suffering“, i.e. „being subject to suffering, being without freedom of mind“. But in my view, this is only a difference of terminology but not a difference of meaning.

According to Wittgenstein, the world *belongs* to that final *I*, and – moreover – the world *is nothing but* the product of this knowledge-constituting und therefore unconstituted *I*; and behind this *I* is nothing but the mystical one. Therefore, the *end of one's life* is the *end of this observer and thinker* and thus the *end of one's world*. But, nevertheless, it is *by no means* the *end of which is standing behind all that*.

Wittgenstein, in obeying his own advice „If you cannot talk about something, then remain silent about it“ does not indicate what – if you stick to this advice – will take place after death. But he indicates that just *this unexplored* – and, as should be added according to his view: *unexplorable* – point of his philosophy is the *most important* part of it. And in my view of his philosophy, it is in its essence identical with the advice of Yājñavalkya to his wife Maitreyī, saying: In order to arrive at and to rest on that mystical one, all the covers of it have to be shedded from it, including the cover of the consciousness and thus the cover of that conscious *I*.

In disregarding this mystical aspect – or, to be more precise: in substituting this deep mystical aspect by an aspect of bad metaphysics –, similar kinds of philosophical absolutenesses are easily to be found also nowadays; for they are wide-spread among contemporary philosophers, even among analytic philosophers, among logicians, and among mathematicians:

According to epistemological aspects, all those analytic philosophers and logicians are representatives of such a position of absoluteness; who are regarding some language of first-order

3 See MN 22; see below.

4 See Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad 3.4.1-2, see also B-Ā-U 3.7+8.

logic – being enriched with epistemic terms like „believing“ and „knowing“ and admitting all finite iterations of them, each of these terms hereby being underlined by the immediately following term „that“ – as the one uppermost meta-language. The meanings of those epistemic terms are thereby, of course, not defined with regard to other terms describing the ways of using them within a language of still higher level, but by a set of axioms of that alleged highest meta-language, being thereby not aware that within languages of first-order logic the meanings of their terms cannot be determined unequivocally.

According to semantical aspects, all those analytic philosophers and logicians are representatives of such a position of absoluteness, who are insisting on some uppermost meta-language from which all lower-levelled languages of such a hierarchy of languages will receive the meanings of their resp. terms: For it is said that without such an original – since not in itself language-established – language the terms of those lower-levelled languages would be without their resp. meanings. Hereby, according to that view, this one alleged language-independent language is established by the Lebenswelt either in its individual or in its social aspects, i.e. in one of the domains of living of the user and/or the users of such a self-established language. Therefore, nothing else than the everyday-language used by those philosophers is regarded to be such a non-surpassable meta-language.

According to ontological aspects, all those analytic philosophers, logicians and mathematicians are representatives of such a position of absoluteness, who are regarding some language of first-order logic – having incorporated some axiomatization of the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory – as the one uppermost meta-language. Hereby these axioms are supposed to be true descriptions of the totality of alleged language-independent sets, being seen in a way with a Platonian eye.

But these kinds of philosophical standpoints of absoluteness appear as being *related* to the ones of Wittgenstein and of Yājñavalkya only at a *first glance*; for – as a more detailed *second view* onto it is indicating – in the core aspect of philosophizing they are *very different* from them and, moreover, *completely opposite* to them. For, as Wittgenstein would argue, they are far away from meeting that mystical one; instead they are captured by bad metaphysics. For they pretend to describe the undescribable, i.e. that mystical one, which exists, which really exists, which is really existing, which is – in a final sense – the only really existing one: All other objects of its world are owning only some depending kind of existence, since their existing depends completely on that one independently existing one.

As long as a *twofold* is conceived – i.e. the *observing one* and the *observed ones* as well as the *thinking one* and the *thought ones* –, that final observer and thinker is *different* not only from the great elements and from the subtle winds, but also from the consciousness. For the consciousness – which is increasing and decreasing together with the subtle energies – is *not* an object *existing independently* from the Self but is *established by* the Self in dividing its state into the *subject* of that state of being conscious of something and into the *object* of that state of that being conscious of something.

Therefore, according to Yājñavalkya, that final observer and thinker which he sometimes denoted with „ātman“ – i.e. with „Self“ – is per se *different from* the directly observable aspects, let them be the *forms* called „rūpa“, or let them be the touchable *great elements* called „mahādḥātu“; and this *Self* is *different* from the non-directly observable *subtle energies* called „prāṇa“, which nevertheless – since being an object of thinking – are describable in describing the *results of the movements of them*, i.e. of the *changing of its states* within the *body* called „kāya“. And this *Self* is also *different* from the *consciousness* called „vijñāna“, i.e. from that part of the mind, which is observing and thinking, which therefore is the centre of the *mind* called „citta“. But this mind, too, is not directly observable, since it, too, is not an Aristotelian substance but an Eulerian continuity of mental states. Nevertheless, this *consciousness* is describable by the *results of its movements*, i.e. by the *changing of its states* within that continuity of mental states. The lattice of *consciousness* and its accompanying *subtle energies* is nothing but the *I* called here „puruṣa“, i.e. the *man*, the *person*, which is in fact *not* the *Self* but the *Servant of the Self*.

The objects of consciousness as well as the subject from which consciousness is directed to those

objects are not arising according to chance or accident, but are subdued to the laws of coming about and passing away. This *twofold* is therefore nothing but *suffering*.

In order to gain the peace of complete liberation from every suffering, a state is to be achieved in time in such a way that, as soon as the complete decay of the body will happen, also the complete decay of the consciousness will take place. This final resting of the Self in itself is the core of Yājñavalkya's instruction given to his wife Maitreyī immediately before his leaving the worldly life in order to get well prepared at the day when the decay of his body will happen:⁵

„(Maitreyī asked her husband Yājñavalkya to show her the way to immortality; and he instructed her as follows:) (...)

„Dear are all the objects in space not because of (alleged) objects in themselves, but because of the (own) Self (within them); and the same holds for the universe as a whole. That one who is alleging the objects of the space outside of (his) Self will remain without any (contact) to those (alleged) objects; and the same holds for the universe as a whole. (For in fact, those objects in space as well as the universe as a whole are objects arisen through the acting of that Self.

Therefore, in seeing, hearing, understanding, recognizing) you have to see, to hear, to understand, to recognize that Self (in being aware of its being the seeing one, the hearing one, the understanding one, the recognizing one). In following that way, Maitreyī, this whole world will be known in seeing, hearing, understanding, recognizing. That is comparable to producing some sound by handling some instrument: You cannot grasp that sound outside the instrument; but in grasping that instrument you also grasped its sounds.

This (Self) is comparable to a fire made with damp wood producing clouds of smoke: In a similar way this (Self) established as its aspiration the Ṛgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmveda, the sciences, and all explications.

This (Self) is – similar to the ocean being the place that unites all waters – like the skin the place of uniting all sensations of touching, like the tongue the place of uniting all tasting, like the nose the place of uniting all smelling, like the eye the place of uniting all forms, like the ear the place of uniting all sounds, like the manas – i.e. the mental sense – the place of uniting all (thinking) (...).

This (Self) is comparable to a lump of salt which, being thrown into water, is dissolving within this water, in such a way that it cannot be removed again from the water which became salty in all of its parts: In this very sense it happens that this great unending unlimited Being consisting completely of knowledge, (which) arose out of the (great) elements, will decline into them again.⁶

For, (as soon as final liberation from suffering by firm and undestructible knowledge of the source of suffering is gained,) then after death there is no longer any consciousness.

That's what I am saying!“

After Yājñavalkya had said this, Maitreyī spoke: „You now confused me by saying that after death there were no consciousness!“ But Yājñavalkya answered her:

„That speech of mine is in no way confusing but leading to insight: For as long as there is some twofold, there is the one who is seeing something else, there is the one who is smelling something else, there is the one who is hearing something else, (there is the one who is touching something else, there is the one who is tasting something else, there is the one who is thinking something else). But as soon as for a person everything became nothing but his own Self, how then should he smell something else, how then should he see something else, how then should he hear something else, (how then should he touch something else, how then should he think something else)?““

5 See B-Ā-U 2.4, here shortened.

6 This statement must *by no means* be understood in a *materialistic-realistic* sense but has *to be* understood in *Yājñavalkya's* sense, i.e. in *his* sense if *idealism-phenomenalism*: In creating a twofold, the the perceiving one is divided from and thus arising out of the great elements (which, in his sense, are of course no Kantian Ding an sich selbst but, quite literally to be understood, observed ones observed by the observer. Then this observer is identifiable, like that lump of salt, being now different from the water. In cessation of observing and thinking, this separation of the observing one and of the thinking one, from the observed ones and the thought ones is then brought to cessation.

Afterwards, while the ability of observing and thinking is still available, this ability is no longer realized, and therefore an observing one or a thinking one is no longer identifiable (see: B-Ā-U 4.3+4): In the water, the lump of salt is nowhere; but in the water, the salt is everywhere.

It seems to me that also Tarski believed in an uppermost meta-language which is no more the subject of any semantical reflection, and that, unfortunately, this believing was of metaphysical kind. For, as he stated, in order to preserve the consistency of an infinite language like that, in which the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is formulated, it is impossible to develop its full semantics in itself, whereas – because of its presupposed unlimited and unmeasurable power of expressibility – there does not exist any stronger meta-language of it, which contains the means to establish that semantics and to measure thereby the semantical strength of it.

But a Tarski-like levelling of semantical reflections – such a hierarchy of levels of languages with increasing strength – need not have an uppermost limit; on the contrary: Such a levelling may be related to the natural numbers as well as to the ordinal numbers whose sequences, too, are without such upper bounds. Moreover, in Gödel's results it is entailed that proofs of consistency for some system of language together with its logic need additional logical means, namely orderings of transfinite bounds that transcend the related bounds of the investigated language, and that such proofs are always in accordance with the structure of the language for which the proof of consistency is to be established. And in combining these results with the conception of a Tarski-like hierarchy of language-levels indicating the increasing strength of expressibility, it is immediately understandable that an uppermost limit of such a sequence does not exist, in principle at least, disregarding our factual limited intellectual capacities and our limited period of life.

Unfortunately, *this* sequence of English expressions, formulated at the end of the last paragraph – while being syntactically correctly formulated – is nevertheless *no senseful* sentence; because, among the possible interpretations of this sequence there is *no one* that might work as the *intended one*. For, in order to formulate such a statement correctly, a super-meta-language beyond the infinite and even transfinite sequence of language-levels is *required*, whereas *the statement itself* alleges the *non-existence* of such a super-meta-language containing the means to measure the strengths of expressibility of *all* language-levels. Therefore, such a sequence of expressions, being formulated at a level of reflection whatsoever, *does not* formulate and *cannot* formulate the *intended* sense. Since *all* senseful statements describing its intended sense *are to be found* at *some* level of that hierarchy of reflection, *that* sequence of expressions is *not a senseful description* of the *sense intended with its formulation*.

But even *this* sequence of words, formulated at the end of the last paragraph, while being syntactically correctly formulated, *may* be a semantically correct description of what was written *previous to that reflection*, but is *not* a semantically correct description in referring to *itself*.

Therefore, the philosophical position of relativity, being the counter-position to that of absoluteness, must *not* contain, of course, the *closing statement of absoluteness*; but, quite astonishing, this position must also *not* contain the *negation* of the *closing statement of absoluteness*. This is to be regarded not only for the semantical aspect of the sequence of levels of reflection, but also for the related ontological and epistemological aspects, and may be understood by similar reasons.

Therefore, as long as someone is using language levels – i.e. levels of reflection – without any limit and nevertheless correctly in this sense of philosophical relativity, his acting is not describable at any of these levels and – since there is no way of describing it beyond these levels – it is also not beyond them: It is, so to speak, nowhere; or, to be more precise: The strength and the power of – what *we* very wrongly may call – „his inner and outer speaking“ is no longer measurable by using the means of some language and its arsenal of ordinal numbers determining such an ordering of reflections.

A lot of questions may arise at that point: The *first* of them will surely be, whether *I myself* am able not only to indicate such a view which is not achievable by any language and therefore not being justifying by any strength of logic, but also to achieve it and to maintain it, for some suitably long period at least; without any hesitation I then will answer *in the negative*. The *second* question of that kind will be, whether I am regarding *one of the contemporary philosophers* or *one of the past Western philosophers* as someone who is holding such a view; my answer then, too, will be *in the negative*, at least to those of them which are known to me. The *third* question of that kind will

be whether I am regarding *one of the Eastern philosophers* as someone who has gained such a view and has been able to maintain this view from thereon; here my answer will be *in the affirmative*: According to, what is known to me, Nagārjuna was one of them. Perhaps also Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana gained the unlimited and thus immeasurable state of mind. And, surely, also Buddha Śākyamuni gained that state; and during the weeks after he acquired the bodhihood, he established this state of mind as an unloseable property of it.

In order to obtain freedom in the sense of Buddhist Arhatship, only *two* levels of epistemological reflection are involved: Given some mental attention *to something* being *no* state of reflection – being, so to speak, the *zeroth* level of reflection –, the *first* level of reflection consists in being mindful concerning *that attention* of the mind; and the *second* level of reflection consists in being watchful concerning *this mindfulness*, i.e. in guarding that mindful mind.⁷

„The subject of the looking-back insight – of pratyavekṣaṇa – consists in investigating and conceiving (things) clearly and completely with one's consciousness and penetrating (them) thus with wisdom. A simile may illustrate this (procedure): There may be a man (observing something) being himself observed by a second one who is observed by a third one, where the first one is laying down, where the second one is sitting behind him, and where the third one is staying behind the sitting one. (...)“

Among these *three* men – i.e. these *three* states of mind –, there is, of course, *one* of them the *uppermost* and *final* one, namely the *standing* one. In other words: In leading my attention to some object, I am using the 0th level of reflection, reflecting thereby nothing of my attention to that object. In leading my attention afterwards – and „meta“ means nothing but „after“ – to even this attention of the 0th level, I am using the 1st level of reflection, remembering thereby that attention to the original object within my mind and establishing mindfulness in doing so; but then my consciousness, in dwelling on that 1st level, is no longer dwelling at the 0th level; for the epistemic observing of that object corresponds to the semantical using of its name, while the epistemic remembering of that object corresponds to the semantical mentioning of its name. In leading my attention still afterwards to even this 1st-level attention of the 0th-level attention, I am using from now on the 2nd level of reflection; and I am thereby, in using this 2nd-level attention now in a non-reflected matter, attached to it: In dwelling at this 2nd level, I am free from being attached to objects of a lower level; but there, at this 2nd level, there is no intellectual distance to the objects of the second level, which means: Being liberated in this way is still far away from being completely awakened.

For why may I be sure that, while dwelling on such a higher level of reflecting, the state of my consciousness is different from dreaming of having woken up? No cogent epistemological argument will lead to such a justified certainty.

But the state of a Buddha is described several times by „saṃbodhi, samyaksambodhi“. i.e. by „completely awakened, throughout completely awakened“, as well as by „paragate, parasamgate“, i.e. by „gone beyond, gone completely beyond“. And after having gained that firm and permanent awakesness, Buddha Śākyamuni *at first* decided *not* to proclaim and to teach the now completely understood and immediately seen *dharmas*, i.e. those *connections*, whose applying may lead to awakening; for he considered:⁸

„These connections which I attained (now) are profound, peaceful and sublime, (but) hard to understand and hard to see; for they are subtle and (therefore) unattainable by mere reasoning, but (nevertheless) to be experienced by the wise. However, this generation delights in adhesion, takes delight in adhesion, rejoices in adhesion. It is hard for such a generation (to understand and) to see this reality, namely those connections of arising from preceding ones (...)“

But within *these* parts of his teachings, which occur to be authentical, there is *nothing* to be found which is irrational or even counterrational. Moreover, *all* the reported disputes with other philosophers were won by him by using *stringent rational* arguments, like the dispute started by Agnivekṣaṇa Dīghanakha:

7 See AN V.28, as well as DN 34.

8 See MV I.5; see also MN 26.

„(...) „Master Gautama! My doctrine and view is this: „Nothing is acceptable to me“!“

„Agnivekṣaṇa! This view „Nothing is acceptable to me“: is not at least that view acceptable to you?“

„If, Master Gautama, this view of mine were acceptable to me, it, too, would be the same, (i.e.: If I would accept this view, then this would imply that this view) too (is unacceptable)!“⁹

„Well, Agnivekṣaṇa, there are plenty in the world who say: „It too would be the same“; yet they do not abandon that view and take up still some other view. (But) those are few in the world who say: „It too would be the same“, and who abandon that view and do not take up some other view.

The doctrine and view of some Śramaṇs and Brāhmiṇs is: „Everything is acceptable to me“, which is close to lust, to delighting, to holding, to clinging, to bondage. The doctrine and view of other Śramaṇs and Brāhmiṇs is: „Nothing is acceptable to me“, which is close to non-lust, to non-delighting, to non-holding, to non-clinging, to non-bondage.“

When this was said, the Śramaṇ Dīghanakha exclaimed: „Master Gautama commends my point of view, yes, he recommends it!“; (but the Blessed One continued unperturbed, saying:)

„The doctrine and view of still other Śramaṇs and Brāhmiṇs is: „Something is acceptable to me, (while) something (else) is not acceptable to me“, which too is close to lust, to delighting, to holding, to clinging, to bondage.

But, Agnivekṣaṇa, a wise man among these Śramaṇs and Brāhmiṇs who holds one of these three doctrines and views considers thus; „If I obstinately adhere to my view and declare: „Only this is true, (but) anything else is false“, then I may clash with those two other Śramaṇs and Brāhmiṇs which hold one of the two other doctrines and views; and when there is a clash, there are disputes; and when there are disputes, there are quarrels; and when there are quarrels, there is vexation!“. Foreseeing for himself clashes, disputes, quarrels, and vexation, he abandons that (doctrine and) view and does not take up some other view. This is how there comes to be the abandoning and the relinquishing of these (doctrines and) views.

(Further on, that wise man goes on to investigate his body and his mind; and as the result of that investigating the body,) (...) he regards the body as impermanent, as suffering, (...) as void, as Non-Self; in regarding the body thus, he abandons desire for the body, affection for the body, subservience to the body. (And in investigating his mind, he receives the related result, as can be easily seen with regard to the feelings:) There are three kinds of feeling: Pleasant ones, painful ones, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant ones. And as soon as a feeling of one of these kind arises, a feeling different from it declines at once. Therefore, Agnivekṣaṇa, feelings are impermanent, be they pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant; (for) they are conditioned and (therefore) subject to destruction; (and, indeed, they are) vanishing, fading away, ceasing (sooner or later).

Seeing thus, a well-taught noble disciple becomes disenchanted with feelings of all three kinds, (be them feelings connected with his mind or with his body). Being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion, liberation (takes place). When liberation (takes place), knowledge (and seeing) arises: „(This is) liberation!“ And he understands: „The life of cleanness has been lived; what was to be done has been done; no more (is) this world!“

A Bhikṣu, Agnivekṣaṇa, whose mind is liberated thus, sides with none and disputes with none. He employs the speech currently used in the world without adhering to it!“ (...)“

In my interpretation of that text, the sentence „Yet they do not abandon that view, and they take up still some other view“ is to be understood thus: They *do not* abandon *that view*; and as a result, they in addition *take up* the *other* view „This view of mine is really true“, being therefore a *meta-view* to the former view allegedly abandoned. And the sentence „He abandons that view and does not take up some other view“ is therefore to be understood thus: He *does* abandon *that view*, but *without taking up* the *other view* „It is really true that this view was to be abandoned“, i.e. *without taking up* such a *meta-view* to the former view really abandoned.

What then does it mean that this peaceful und sublime state which Buddha Śākyamuni arrived and maintained was unattainable by mere reasoning? And why is this state unlimited and

9 For „If A, then not A“ logically implies „not A“. Obviously, this rule of logic was taken as valid by both of the disputants.

immeasurable, as is reported¹⁰ several times? And what is meant by saying that the throughout completely awakened one *cannot be identified*? For his *form* – i.e. the shape of his body during his lifetime – *was* of course *identifiable* and was identified by all the others who saw him. And if his *mind* thereby were dwelling on some alleged uppermost level of reflection, his *consciousness* were identifiable with the strength and power of that level and thus measurable with the degree of that level of expressibility of that used inner or even outer language. But the *throughout completely awakened one* – this is the conclusion of my sight of his theoretical philosophy – is *not to be found* at such a level of outer or inner speaking.

Buddha Śākyamuni, as may be well noticed by reading those parts of the Buddhist sūtras which may be regarded as being authentic – was an invincible master of applying perfectly the rules of logic. And, furthermore, he was a skillful master of applying doctrines and views *onto themselves*: He tested *other* doctrines and views in applying their contents *onto themselves*. And he *also* applied his *own* doctrine and view *onto itself*, indicating in *this* way, what is *beyond* language and expressibility and therefore also *beyond* logic and reasoning.¹¹

„(...) „Bhiksus! I shall show you how the (explanation of the) connections is similar to a raft, being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping. (...)

Suppose a man in the course of a journey saw a great expanse of water, whose near shore was dangerous and fearful and whose further shore was safe and free from fear; but there was no ferryboat or bridge going to the far shore. Then he thought: „(...) I will collect grass, twigs, branches, and leaves and bind them together into a raft; and supported by that raft and making an effort with my hands and feet, I will get safely across to the far shore!“: (...) And in doing so he got safely across to the far shore. Then, (...) (if) he might think thus: „This raft has been helpful to me. (...) (Therefore) I will hoist it to my head or load it on my shoulder, and then go wherever I want!“, by doing so, Bhiksus, would that man be doing what should be done with that raft?“

„No, venerable sir!“

„By doing what would that man be doing what should be done with that raft? He should think thus: „This raft has been very helpful to me. (...) (But) now I will haul it onto the dry land or set it adrift in the water, and then go wherever I want!“. Now, it is by doing so that that man would be doing what should be done with that raft.

So I have shown you how the (explanation of the) connections is similar to a raft, being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping. (As soon as you will understand the explanation of) the connection to be similar to (such) a raft, you should abandon even helpful (explanations of the) connections, how much more the non-helpful ones!“: (...)

The Ancient Roman god Januarius had two faces at his head: one of them in front, and the other of them behind. This was, of course, symbolizing the meaning: The one face was looking in time forward, while the other face was looking in time backward. According to my view of this simile, in individual and in social daylife as well as in trying to establish sound philosophies upon both of them, its meaning is: In order to decide correctly what should be done in the future, a solid knowledge of one's own state is unavoidable; and in order to gain such a solid knowledge, a clean seeing of one's own origins is unavoidable.

10 See, e.g., MN 44, SN 6.7+8, SN 44.1.

11 See MN 22.